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Introduction
Interpretations of the consequences of the global eco-
nomic crisis for the future of European welfare states 
have been far from uniform. According to the gloom-
iest reading, the post-2008 developments have ques-
tioned the very foundations of social protection 
systems through a series of paradigmatic reforms, a 
process that might put an end to the ambition of creat-
ing a ‘Social Europe’ (e.g. Pochet and Degryse, 2012; 
Taylor-Gooby, 2012). Others insist that no consistent 
pattern of welfare retrenchment or austerity can be 
detected. Rather, interventions vary widely across 
regions and according to the size of welfare states 
(Starke et al., 2013). Scholars of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) agree that the economic crisis hit the 
post-socialist states especially hard due to their small 
and exposed economies and internal political and 
social tensions that had cumulated following their 
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2004 and 2007 EU accessions.1 By the time the crisis 
hit Europe, most of these states – with the notable 
exception of Poland – have experienced economic 
decline, weakening administrative capacities, 
increased corruption and social instability (e.g. 
Rupnik and Zielonka, 2013). Strict EU requirements 
on macro-economic stability have provided little 
room for manoeuvre in the field of welfare reforms, 
especially after the Greek crisis. Social policy reforms 
in the CEE countries in the 2010s have thus to be 
understood in the framework of a multiple crisis situ-
ation and the barriers and opportunities provided by 
the EU and global lending agencies.
This article is concerned with the reactions of 
Hungarian governments and especially the 
Conservative coalition since 2010 to the global eco-
nomic crisis and its social and political conse-
quences. Bohle and Greskovits (2012) have argued 
recently that neo-liberal regimes of the Baltic states 
have suffered most from the crisis while the so-
called ‘embedded neo-liberal regimes’ of the 
Visegrád states, where the delicate balance between 
(neo-)liberal market forces, social protection sys-
tems and democratic institutions could be main-
tained in the past two decades, have become less 
exposed to the current economic crisis (pp. 224–5). 
Once the forerunner of building democracy and mar-
ket economy, Hungary seems to be the odd one out 
as both democratic institutions and the ‘welfare con-
tract’ have been challenged recently in this country 
(pp. 238–9). Agencies measuring democratic trans-
formation and good governance have reported the 
steep decline of such institutions in Hungary – much 
more so than in fellow CEE countries (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung (BS), 2012; Economic Intelligence Unit 
(EIU), 2011; Freedom House, 2012). Economic 
recession since the mid-2000s (OECD 2012a), high 
budget deficit (9.4% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2006) and the increasingly sharp split 
between the political left and right (culminated in 
violent riots organized by the extreme right wing and 
promoted by the moderate right in 2006) have accen-
tuated the inherent volatility (Szikra and Tomka, 
2009) of the welfare system of Hungary by the end 
of the decade.
The Conservative coalition of Fidesz – Hungarian 
Civic Union and the Christian Democratic Party 
(KDNP) – having gained a landslide victory at the 
2010 elections, has embarked on radical reforms in 
nearly all areas of the welfare system in a very short 
period of time. What makes the Hungarian case 
especially interesting is that while changes have 
affected a wide segment of the society, there have 
been no widespread protests against them and no 
veto players have prevented their implementation. 
We argue in this article that fundamental change in a 
very short time has been achieved through eliminat-
ing barriers from the way of the executive power. 
Former democratic institutions have remained in 
place but substantial elements of democracy, like 
participation and the protection of minority rights, 
have largely been eradicated (BS, 2012), and this has 
had devastating consequences for social rights as 
well. The function of the parliament has been limited 
to being a ‘rubber stamp’ on legislations initiated by 
the coalition (e.g. Krugman, 2011). Bureaucrats, 
who could have precluded reforms, have been suc-
cessfully put down by new regulations, such as the 
compulsory retirement of civil servants and judges at 
the age of 62 and by the novel possibility of the 
‘emergency dismissal’ of civil servants in case of 
‘loss of trust’ (Act CXCIX/2011). Other stakehold-
ers, like trade unions, have been pacified by small 
concessions concerning the (originally much more 
severe) new Labour Code (Act I/2012) and social 
insurance legislation. The Constitutional Court, an 
important player in protecting fundamental rights in 
the Visegrád countries, has been gradually sidelined 
through various measures since the summer of 2010 
(see details below). We are going to show in this arti-
cle that several social policy–related measures have 
been incorporated into the unilaterally adopted con-
stitution (Fundamental Law, 2011) and ‘cardinal 
acts’ to ensure that changes would last beyond one 
political term. Shifts in welfare policies, at the same 
time, sharply divide the political arena and are often 
against people’s actual lifestyles, which, eventually, 
might lead to political action.
Another peculiar feature of welfare reforms in 
Hungary is that the direction of changes, although 
affecting the poorest to a disproportionate extent 
(Kósa 2012), does not follow a uniform neo-liberal 
pattern of retrenchment. Rather, the ‘emergency’ 
reforms (Inglot, 2008) of the past 3 years have been 
 by guest on September 11, 2014esp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Szikra 3
characterized by a mixture of neo-liberal, étatist and 
neo-conservative elements; such radically opposing 
elements have not been present elsewhere in the 
region. The neo-liberal agenda is best illustrated by 
the fact that Hungary (along with Greece) has been 
one of the few countries within the European Union 
with a massive welfare state retrenchment during the 
crisis years, with real social spending decreasing by 
13–14 percent between 2008 and 2012 (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), 2012b). Social policy reforms have not 
been aimed at providing social protection to the most 
vulnerable groups of society and a reverse redistribu-
tion towards the wealthy has taken place since 2010 
(Szívós and Tóth, 2013). At the same time, we 
observe an increased involvement of the state in the 
administration of nearly all policy areas: the centrali-
zation of the primary education and the healthcare 
systems (with schools and hospitals taken over by the 
state from the municipalities since 2013), the rapid 
nationalization of the pension system and the takeo-
ver of public works programmes by the Ministry of 
Interior are some cases in point. A pronounced neo-
conservative agenda has also emerged in the field of 
education and family policies with the growing influ-
ence of churches, especially the Catholic Church, in 
setting the ideological frame of policies by means of 
the new constitution and by taking over an increasing 
number of kindergartens and schools. The explicit 
promotion of the ‘traditional family’ as opposed to 
gender equality and liberty to choose one’s own life-
style is also a part of this agenda.
The structure of this article is as follows: first, the 
most important political changes since 2010 and their 
effects on social policy are summarized with a focus 
on the new constitution. Then, three case studies 
illustrate the neo-liberal, étatist and neo-conservative 
turn of social policies in Hungary:
1. Reforms in the pension scheme with a focus 
on the nationalization of a formerly private pil-
lar and drastic cuts in social insurance rights;
2. The new unemployment benefit system, 
characterized by curbing social rights of the 
unemployed and replacing activation poli-
cies with a compulsory public works 
programme;
3. The new family policy, illustrating a reverse 
redistribution from poor to rich families 
while also showing how the cabinet intends 
to strengthen conservative and patriarchal 
family values.
The impact of changes is briefly considered in the 
conclusion, focusing on the polarization of society 
and an increase in deep poverty, especially, but not 
only, among Roma. The last section also refers to the 
possible role of the European Union in handling the 
effects of volatile political and welfare systems in 
some member states.
Dismantling democracy
The conservative coalition of Fidesz–KDNP has 
used the global economic crisis to justify ‘unortho-
dox measures’ in the political and economic sphere, 
in particular to remove democratic barriers from the 
way of the executive power. The acting party presi-
dent of Fidesz, Lajos Kósa, indicated as early as 
June 2010 that in a crisis situation, ‘economic con-
stitutionality can be suspended’ (Index, 2010). At 
the same time, their two-thirds majority in 
Parliament provided the opportunity for the coali-
tion to carry out paradigmatic changes and offer 
radical and rapid ‘solutions’ to some of the long-
existing social and economic problems, including 
the financing of the pension system and low employ-
ment and fertility rates.
The extreme speed of the legislation is illus-
trated by the fact that more than 700 acts have been 
implemented within 3 years, including the new con-
stitution and cardinal acts (Hungarian News Agency 
(HNA), 2013). One of the most significant methods 
of avoiding public consultation has been the exten-
sive use of private bills in Parliament to which pro-
cedural rules of consultation and proper debate in 
Parliament do not apply (European Parliament 
(EP), 2013: 12). The majority of the politically 
important bills were handed in by individual Fidesz 
members of parliament (MPs) instead of the gov-
ernment, including the Fundamental Law, as well 
as many of its amendments and most of the cardinal 
laws (e.g. EP, 2013; Scheppele, 2012). Special 
forms of the legislative process that were earlier 
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used only in emergency situations to solve burning 
problems affecting the wider public (like natural 
catastrophes) have turned into tools for rushing 
‘ordinary’ legislation through on issues like the 
pension reform and access to public information, 
taking just a few hours for acts to pass after being 
handed in (Dobszai, 2013).
While civil society, experts and trade unions 
found it increasingly difficult to follow legislation, 
tripartite negotiations and civil consultation have 
been cancelled altogether. The prime minister 
declared in the summer of 2010 that ‘the two-thirds 
majority means that the population have legitimized 
the government’s decision-making without the con-
sent of the NIRC (National Interest Reconciliation 
Council)’ (BS, 2012: 11; see also Neumann and 
Váradi, 2012: 44; Szabó, 2013: 210). The earlier sys-
tem of distribution of state funds to civil organiza-
tions (non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) 
through a self-elected body (National Civil Fund 
(NCA)) has been dismantled and replaced by a loyal 
leadership; institutionalized consultation with civil 
organizations stopped.
The speedy nomination of those loyal to Fidesz to 
the top most important economic, social, cultural 
and judicial positions in Hungary has led to a loss of 
independence of the most important institutions of 
democratic checks and balances. To provide but a 
few examples, the new President of State, János 
Áder, has been a founding member of Fidesz and a 
friend of Viktor Orbán since the mid-1980s. György 
Matolcsy, prime confidant of the Premier has been 
directly appointed to the head of the Hungarian 
National Bank from his chair as Minister of National 
Economy. Political debates and the possibility of 
developing alternative political interpretations have 
also been limited by the speedy ‘colonization’ of the 
public media by Fidesz (Bajomi-Lázár, 2013).
The 1989 constitution was amended several 
times and a new constitution was rushed through in 
an exceptionally short period (1 month) with no pos-
sibility for substantial public debate. The ruling 
party enacted the constitution without votes from 
the opposition parties, contributing to the division 
rather than the unification of the Hungarian nation 
(e.g. Lendvai, 2012; Tóth, 2012). Scholars of the 
new political system agree that these changes grant 
an almost unlimited power to Fidesz, and that undo-
ing such development will be difficult (Bánkuti 
et al., 2012; Jenne and Mudde, 2012; Kornai, 2011; 
Tóth, 2012).
The Fundamental Law abandoned the idea of a 
secular state based on a pluralist society. Its 
‘Preamble’ is an ideological statement that stresses 
the role of Christianity in ‘preserving nationhood’ 
and explicitly refers to Catholicism. Most Hungarians 
are at the same time non-religious and only a frac-
tion are observant Catholics practising their religion 
on a weekly or monthly basis (Rosta, 2011). While 
‘family’, ‘nation’, ‘work’ and ‘order’ are key con-
cepts used in the Fundamental Law, the principle of 
equality is not part of the text. To the contrary, ‘many 
provisions have an anti-egalitarian character’ 
(Kovács, 2012: 171). The Fundamental Law has 
severely limited the scope of the Constitutional 
Court. Abolishing the ex post review of budget-
related laws, including legislation on taxation and 
social insurance (EP, 2013: 12), is of central impor-
tance from a social policy perspective, as the case of 
pension reform illustrates in this article. It can be 
argued that there is no constitutional control over a 
wide range of governmental activities any longer, 
including social policy legislation (Sólyom, 2013).
The new constitution has been amended five 
times since its enactment. Its Fourth Amendment 
provoked international uproar, including a letter 
from José Manuel Barroso to Viktor Orbán, as it 
integrated measures into the text that the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court had previously found unconsti-
tutional. A number of these changes directly affect 
social policies. An outstanding example is Article 
22, granting power to local authorities to criminalize 
homelessness ‘in order to protect public order, pub-
lic security, public health and cultural values’ 
(Fundamental Law, 2011). This practically means 
that local authorities may continue with their recent 
practice of fining the homeless for sleeping rough 
(see, for example, Gorondi, 2013; Verseck, 2013). 
The parliament has also enacted over 40 ‘cardinal 
laws’ that can only be modified by a two-thirds par-
liamentary majority (e.g. Bánkuti et al., 2012: 3). 
Most cardinal laws regulate issues that are decided 
by simple parliamentary majority in other European 
countries, and thus, it will be difficult for any future 
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government having a simple majority ‘to respond to 
social changes’ which can ‘potentially diminish the 
importance of new elections’ (EP, 2013: 21).
‘Take the money and run’: the 
pension reform
The global financial crisis has uncovered the eco-
nomic and political problems of the governing of 
pension systems in Europe and beyond. Diminished 
returns of private funds have revealed ‘the limitations 
of pension fund capitalism’, while high public debt 
has narrowed the scope of any potential manoeuvre 
of welfare arrangements available to governments 
(Ebbinghaus et al., 2012: 241; Guardiancich 2013). 
These problems have proved to be more fatal for 
CEE countries that have had partially privatized pen-
sion systems since the late 1990s and the early 2000s 
(Müller, 1999; Orenstein, 2008) and that have been 
hit harder by the crisis than Western European wel-
fare states. The central issue has become how to 
finance the increasing transition costs of pension pri-
vatization from shrinking government resources 
(Drahokoupil and Domonkos, 2012: 286). Most of 
these countries have chosen to temporarily re-direct 
part of the contributions paid to the private funds to 
the state budget. The Hungarian government took a 
step further and decided to nationalize private pen-
sion assets and to eliminate the private pillar alto-
gether (Simonovits, 2011). This way Hungary 
returned to its pre-1998 mandatory pension system, 
consisting of a sole pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public 
scheme, that was developed after the Second World 
War (Inglot, 2008; Szikra, 2009). The voluntary pil-
lar, introduced in 1993, has remained intact.
The two-thirds majority in Parliament has ena-
bled Fidesz to implement long-planned reforms in 
the pension system, including the elimination of 
early retirement benefit schemes (Act CLXVII/2011). 
It has become a basic rule that no one can receive 
old-age pensions under the age of 62 after 2012. An 
exception has been made for women with 40 years of 
contributions – a novel attempt to link pro-natalist 
family policy aims with the old-age pension system. 
In the case of civil servants and judges, however, it is 
not a possibility but a compulsion to retire at the age 
of 62. Although no official explanation has been 
given to this legislation, political analysts consider 
this as an implementation of the anti-communist ide-
ology of Fidesz to dismantle ‘clotted structures’ (see, 
for example, Vári, 2012), that is, to replace the ‘old’ 
elites with ones that are loyal to the conservatives. 
Another explanation might be that salaries of young 
professionals tend to be lower than that of their older 
colleagues, and this saves resources for the treasury. 
The separation of disability benefits from the old-
age pension scheme (Act CXCI/2011) has likewise 
become a part of the neo-liberal austerity package of 
the Structural Reform Programme (Ministry of 
National Economy (MNE), 2011).
The biggest financial gains have, however, been 
made by the nationalization of private pensions. The 
private pillar, propagated by the World Bank in the 
1990s, was introduced following the ‘Argentinean 
model’ by the socialist–liberal coalition in 1997 
(Müller, 1999). Instead of building a new scheme on 
top of the existing one, the new pillar was ‘carved 
out’ from the old PAYG scheme: about a quarter of 
the mandatory contributions were channelled into 
the private pillar (Simonovits, 2011: 83). Membership 
became compulsory for new entrants to the labour 
market implying that in the long term ‘the mixed 
system would become universal’ (Augusztinovics et 
al., 2002: 38). Despite high administrative costs, the 
low level of transparency and low returns (e.g. 
Augusztinovics et al., 2002; Czajlik and Szalay, 
2005), the private pillar has become surprisingly 
popular. Three-quarters of all employees (approxi-
mately 3 million people, including about 2 million 
older employees for whom the private pillar was not 
mandatory) entered private funds which accumu-
lated an amount equal to about 10 percent of the 
GDP by 2011 (Simonovits, 2011).
Fidesz has been opposing the privatization pro-
cess from the very beginning on anti-capitalist and 
nationalist grounds. The major reason, however, 
for the Orbán cabinet to reform the pension sys-
tem was the huge burden transition costs meant 
for the budget. These amounted to about 1.3 per-
cent of the GDP in 2011 (Simonovits, 2011), and 
hindered the implementation of one of the central 
elements of the governmental programme, the intro-
duction of a 16 percent flat-rate personal income tax. 
To be able to meet the Maastrich-criteria of 
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keeping the government deficit below 3 percent of 
the GDP, and at the same time achieve its ambi-
tious aims, the cabinet turned to the European 
Commission and asked for the deduction of the 
transitional costs of the privatised pension system 
from the amount of the government deficit.2 In its 
decision in August 2010, the Commission insisted 
on the original deficit ceiling for reasons includ-
ing the permanent overspending of Hungary and 
also the fear that the Greek debt crisis would be 
repeated in the Eastern European region 
(Simonovits, 2011: 89). The government never-
theless remained committed to the tax reforms, 
and the related bill was adopted by the Parliament 
in mid-October 2010. Just 10 days later, the cabi-
net announced, and the Parliament accepted 
despite the protest of opposition parties, that con-
tributions due to the private pension funds would 
be directed to the treasury for 14 months (Act 
CI/2010) as well as the possibility that private 
pension fund members could return to the public 
pillar (Act C/2010). Re-directing resources from 
private funds was thus linked to the tax-reform 
and the strict requirements provided by the 
European Commission on budget deficit. Very 
soon, in late November, the more radical plan to 
completely eliminate the private pillar was intro-
duced to the Parliament by the Minister of National 
Economy, and by 13 December, it was accepted 
without public debate or consultation. Instead of 
directly confiscating private pension assets, the 
new legislation declared that those who stayed in 
private pension funds would not be eligible for the 
future accrual of a state pension although their 
employers would be obliged to contribute to that 
scheme as well.3 The justification of the bill was 
that ‘those who do not return to the public pension 
scheme will, as it were, “opt out” from the national 
social security system’ (Bill T/1817:12). Members 
of private pension funds had just a month to make 
a decision, and finally, 97 percent ‘opted’ for the 
public scheme.
Instead of organizing large-scale demonstrations, 
private pension fund members turned to the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court against the infringe-
ment of their property rights. They had little chance 
of a legal remedy as the (old) constitution had been 
amended just before the new bill on the private pen-
sion funds was submitted. In mid-November, a bill 
(handed in by a Fidesz MP, and modified just a few 
hours before enactment) initiated the ceasing of the 
right of the Constitutional Court to reverse legisla-
tion on ‘national and local budgets, contributions 
and taxes’ (Bill nr. T/1445). The removal of fiscal 
laws from the jurisdiction of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court, originally meant as a tempo-
rary measure, was later made into a firm part of the 
new Fundamental Law, with the consequence that 
‘[t]he Parliament can now enact fiscal laws that vio-
late the constitution and individual rights, and the 
Constitutional Court is not just temporarily but per-
manently barred from reviewing them’ (Halmai and 
Scheppele, 2012: 12.). A year later, private fund 
members regained their rights to accruals in state 
pensions. By this time, however, only a small frac-
tion of the formal members remained in the private 
pillar.
Contributions by private fund members, as well 
as all accumulated assets of former members, were 
automatically transferred to the newly created ‘Fund 
for Pension Reform and the Decrease of the Deficit’ 
(Governmental Decree 87/2011), the management of 
which has been far from transparent. It is estimated 
that about half of the amount was spent on decreas-
ing the budget deficit, which dropped to a record low 
of 1.9 percent in 2012 (Eurostat, 2013). At the same 
time, due to various transactions and economic pro-
cesses (including the devaluation of the Hungarian 
Forint), the explicit debt of the Hungarian state has 
not been reduced successfully, and reached 82.4 per-
cent of the GDP by 2013, the same rate as in 2010 
(Eurostat, 2013). The creation of notional personal 
accounts in the public pension scheme, promised by 
a governmental declaration in December 2010 to 
calm down private fund members, is still pending.
The confiscation of private pension funds within 
just 2 months, without debate and with no compensa-
tion to previous members, has yet been unprece-
dented in the developed world. The closest antecedent 
has probably been the Argentine pension reform, 
where the private pillar, created during the early 
1990s, has been nationalized as a reaction to the 
global crisis in 2008, although with the support of 
the opposition (Orihuela, 2008). The idea to decrease 
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public debt through the nationalization of formerly 
privatised pension funds seems to spread quickly in 
CEE countries: the Polish government has recently 
announced a similar step leading to major public dis-
content (e.g. Goettig, 2013). The conservative cabi-
net of Hungary, truly confined by global financial 
circumstances, acted as if the country was in a state 
of revolution where the end justifies the means. The 
2010 Hungarian pension reform has been an extraor-
dinary example of a ‘permanent pension reform’ in 
the country (Augusztinovics et al., 2002), a symp-
tom of ‘emergency welfare states’ in operation in the 
region (Inglot, 2008).
‘Down by law’: the public works 
programme
The explicit obligation of unemployment benefit 
recipients to engage in activation measures as well 
as the spread of ‘work first’ programmes has been 
typical trends all over Europe in the last decade 
(Clasen and Clegg, 2011: 9). Struggling with an 
astonishingly low employment rate (61.2% of men 
and 50.6% of women aged 15–64 years were 
employed in 2011; Fazekas et al., 2013: 344), 
Hungary has been no exception to the rule: a series 
of reforms to activate the long-term unemployed 
have been implemented since the early 2000s. What 
is important is that the former socialist cabinet linked 
social assistance to public works in 2009 paying the 
minimum wage to public workers (Duman and 
Scharle, 2011). Arguing that earlier programmes 
have been too fragmented and left loopholes for peo-
ple to ‘avoid work’, the new conservative govern-
ment has set out to radically reform labour market 
policies. A new Labour Code, favouring employees, 
was adopted in 2011 (Szabó, 2013), and the length 
and the level of unemployment benefits have been 
cut, like in case of the Hartz reforms in Germany 
(Dingeldey, 2011). The post-2010 Hungarian 
reforms have been distinct, however, due to the inor-
dinate scale of cuts, the nearly total replacement of 
active labour market policies with a punitive public 
works programme and the fact that its principles 
have been included into the new constitution.
The government’s grandiose plan has been to 
establish a ‘workfare society’ (munka alapú 
társadalom) as a positive alternative to ‘the decline of 
Western welfare states’ (Orbán, 2012) and to create 
1 million jobs within 10 years (Hungarian Government, 
2011). The cult of ‘work’ has been integrated into the 
Fundamental Law accordingly, stating that ‘every 
person shall be obliged to contribute to the enrich-
ment of the community to their best ability and poten-
tial’. Article 19 limits social rights to a ‘set of risks’ 
including unemployment, but only in case it was ‘not 
caused by citizens’ own actions’. Furthermore, ‘[t]he 
nature and extent of social subsidies are to be deter-
mined according to “the usefulness of the beneficiar-
ies” activities for the community’. The Constitution, 
however, does not give guidance as for who is to 
determine the ‘usefulness’ of citizens’ work. Since the 
acceptance of the Fundamental Law in April 2011, 
citizens are entitled to social rights only if they fulfil 
their work responsibilities, a measure that excludes 
the ‘idle poor’ from social rights.
Unemployment insurance has accordingly been 
reduced from 9 to a maximum of 3 months (modi-
fication of Act IV/1991), which is currently the 
shortest period within the European Union (Missoc, 
2013). The amount of social assistance (to be 
received after the period of unemployment insur-
ance has expired) has been nominally cut from 20 
to 15 percent of the average wage (modification of 
Act III/1993). Both of these benefits have been 
linked to the acceptance of employment opportuni-
ties regardless of the recipients’ educational levels 
or skills. If there are no employment opportunities, 
one is obliged to join the public works programme 
for at least 30 days (Act CVI/2011). When failing 
to enter the public works programme immediately 
upon call, one risks being excluded from the social 
assistance system altogether. Besides the work-
test, strict behaviour tests have been imposed upon 
benefit claimants: as of January 2012, local gov-
ernments can exclude unemployed people from 
social assistance and public works in case they 
would not keep their houses and gardens ‘tidy’ 
(Act III/1993). The latest modification of the act 
(September 2013) allows for exclusion also in the 
case of a child of the beneficiary who is caught 
truanting from school.4
The original name of the new public works pro-
gramme, ‘National Work Plan’, reminds one of the 
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totalitarian regime of the 1930s in Hungary when a 
programme with the same name was initiated by the 
autocratic and anti-Semitic conservative politician, 
Gyula Gömbös. He envisioned a boost of the heavy 
industry by providing ‘work instead of welfare’, and 
denied ‘any form of social assistance to the able-
bodied’ (Nemzeti Munkaterv (National Work Plan), 
1932). The name of the programme was changed to 
‘Hungarian Work Plan’ (Magyar Munkaterv) after the 
link to Gömbös’ programme was revealed by the 
media (Amerikai Népszava, 2011). Still, the adminis-
tration of the programme has been moved to the 
Ministry of Interior, similarly to the activation pro-
grammes in the 1930s and 1940s, a fact proudly 
acknowledged by the minister himself (Fekete, 2011).
While the overall spending on unemployment has 
decreased substantially and the capacity of job cen-
tres has been drastically cut (Elek and Scharle, 2011), 
the amount spent on the public works programmes 
doubled between 2011 and 2012. Public workers, the 
vast majority of whom have been engaged in physi-
cal work in forestry, waterworks and local renova-
tions, are not protected by the new Labour Code. A 
special ‘public works minimum wage’ was created at 
70 percent of the national minimum wage. Paid 
weekly, rather than monthly, the pattern of the mini-
mal wage copies the traditional remuneration of 
(agricultural) day-labourers, rather than regular 
labour contracts. Local authorities have the right to 
deduct any due payments from the salaries of public 
workers: those indebted with communal payments 
might see only a fraction of their salary. No wonder 
that the rate of the registered unemployed not receiv-
ing any social assistance or benefits grew from 40 to 
52 percent between 2010 and 2012 (Cseres-Gergely 
et al., 2013: 34), whereas a growing number of unem-
ployed decided not to register.
Having received hundreds of complaints, the 
Hungarian Ombudsman investigated the public 
works programme and argued that the problems 
most frequently arise are due to a lack of public work 
opportunities (Ombudsman of Fundamental Rights, 
2012). As local governments are not obliged to 
organize public works for all the unemployed in 
their area, many people fail to meet the required 
30-day’s attendance in such programmes, leading to 
their exclusion from social assistance. This loophole 
is blatantly misused by some racist mayors who have 
mainly excluded the Roma from this programme. 
Roma women in Gyöngyös, a small town in North-
East Hungary, for example, turned to the Ombudsman 
stating that they were excluded from the public 
works programme due to their ‘wearing traditional 
costumes’ at work (Ombudsman of Fundamental 
Rights, 2012: 2). According to a human rights watch-
dog that regularly reports on villages run by the 
Hungarian extreme right wing party, Jobbik, Roma 
are not given enough information about public works 
programmes and often face extremely humiliating 
conditions if they are included (Társaság a 
Szabadságjogokért (TASZ), 2013).
There has been no monitoring or evaluation of the 
Hungarian Work Plan. Earlier research indicates that 
the chance of unemployed people (re)entering labour 
market slightly decreased in villages with extensive 
public works programmes (Köllő and Scharle, 2011). 
The government communicates the programme as 
success because public workers have been counted 
as ‘employees’ instead of ‘unemployed’, thus con-
tributing to the slight increase of employment rates 
(62.5% for men and 52.1% for women in 2012 
(Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO), 
2013)). The real winners of the public works pro-
gramme have been local mayors who can get access 
to cheap labour to do communal work, build gutters 
and so on (Koltai and Kulinyi, 2013). Schools and 
even emergency services have been reported to have 
fired public employees and taking on public workers 
instead, thereby further decreasing the chances of 
effective and protected employment (Ombudsman 
of Fundamental Rights, 2012). Some argue that the 
increasingly harsh policy of Fidesz on public works 
serves the purpose to attract voters of the extreme 
right wing party (Jobbik) by fuelling anti-Roma and 
anti-poor sentiments (Gall, 2013; Rádi, 2013). 
Surely, the long-term unemployed and especially the 
Roma have been the greatest losers of this reform, 
due to the cuts in benefit levels and the possibility of 
being excluded from the social assistance system as 
a result of local mayors’ arbitrary decisions that have 
no chance for legal remedy. Such exclusion means 
that the ‘idle poor’ are increasingly deprived from 
social rights to any financial assistance, which is in 
line with the new constitution.
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‘Honey, I shrunk the kids’: family 
policies
Family policies have enjoyed a priority over a long 
time period in the history of Hungarian social policy 
(Glass and Fodor, 2007; Szikra, 2011). Long paren-
tal leaves, established under state socialism with the 
aim to increase birth rates and to keep mothers away 
from the labour market, have been kept and even 
been extended after the fall of state socialism; still, 
birth rates have been steadily decreasing since the 
1960s, reaching a negative record of 1.23 total fertil-
ity rate (the number of children born per women) in 
2012, the lowest within the European Union 
(Eurostat, 2012). While they do not seem to induce 
higher birth rates, long parental leaves keep mothers 
at home for an average of 5 years, and thus contrib-
ute to low female employment rates (Bálint and 
Köllő, 2008).
Socialist governments have twice attempted to 
reduce long parental leaves unsuccessfully: once in 
1996 with the elimination of earnings-related, 2-year-
long parental leave (Gyermekgondozási Díj, GYED) 
and then in 2009 with the reduction of flat-rate, 
3-year-long child care allowance (Gyermekgondozási 
Segély, GYES) to 2 years as part of austerity pack-
ages. In both cases, the Orbán cabinet restored long 
leaves, in order to give back the ‘right of mothers’ to 
stay at home with their children. Even more than long 
leaves, family allowance and family tax credits have 
become a battlefield between the two major political 
forces in the last two decades. Socialist governments 
focused on child poverty and argued that ‘every child 
counts equally’, thus increasing universal child-
allowance, family-related social assistance and 
decreasing tax credits (Inglot et al., 2012). 
Conservatives, in turn, declared in 1998, and again in 
2010, that family policies should be detached from 
social policies and instead be aimed at boosting fertil-
ity rates among ‘working families’.
We can distinguish two types of measures imple-
mented by the present conservative cabinet to achieve 
its aim: first, assuming that the ‘liberalization’ of 
relationships has been one of the main reasons for 
declining birth rates, the Orbán government initiated 
the restoration of ‘traditional family values’ and has 
fought against gender equality and homosexual 
relationships. Second, a generous tax-credit system 
has been introduced, providing increased financial 
support for better-off families.
The centrality of the ‘traditional family’ in the 
present-day conservative ideology is best illustrated 
by the fact that this notion has been incorporated into 
the newly implemented constitution which states 
that ‘(t)he family shall be … based on the marriage 
of a man and a woman’ (Article L). The exclusionary 
definition of the ‘family’ not only prevents marriage 
between same-sex couples but also discriminates 
against thousands of heterosexual cohabiting cou-
ples and their children. Such definition has earlier 
been found to be anti-constitutional and was thus 
downturned by the Constitutional Court. As a reac-
tion, the government decided to include it into the 
new constitution with the Fourth Amendment of the 
Fundamental Law. There has been a setback in all 
areas of gender equality, including the participation 
of women in politics (e.g. European Women’s Lobby 
(EWL), 2012). Certainly, Hungary today exhibits the 
lowest share of female MPs within the European 
Union, with no more than 8.8 percent (Inter 
Parliamentary Union (IPU), 2013). The only consul-
tative body dealing with gender issues (the Council 
for Social Equality among Women and Men, set up 
in 2000) has been disbanded, and thus, interaction 
between the government and women’s organizations 
has stopped (Juhász, 2012; Szikra, 2013).
The other important line of policies has been the 
expansion of income of better-off families and the 
shrinking protection of poor families. The expecta-
tion of conservative governments (both between 
1998 and 2002 and since 2010) has been that 
increased resources for better-off families would 
boost fertility rates among them (e.g. Lakner, 2006; 
MNE, 2012), while it has been tacitly assumed that 
decreasing or devaluing universal and means-tested 
benefits would prevent poor (and Roma) families to 
have more children.5 The differential treatment of 
low-income and better-off families has been present 
since the 1930s and was part of the state socialist 
‘population policies’ as well (see Gábos and Tóth, 
2000). 6 Following this tradition, the new conserva-
tive cabinet has provided better-off ‘working’ fami-
lies with remarkable financial resources through tax 
credits – despite the crisis and the general cutback in 
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social spending. Families with one or two children 
have gained 7 percent of the average salary per child 
per month in 2012, while larger families can keep 
23 percent of the average salary per child. For exam-
ple, the net income of a family with four children 
may increase by the amount of the average salary in 
case they have enough deductable income (see 
detailed tables in Inglot et al., 2012). Meanwhile, the 
earlier compensation for low-income earners has 
been terminated, and universal family allowance 
(received also by ‘non-working’ families) has not 
been indexed since 2009 and has lost about 20 per-
cent of its value.
Providing increasing resources to better-off fami-
lies, however, did not lead to the growth of birth 
rates. Right to the contrary, the total number of child-
births has been significantly lower than it was under 
the socialist government which was not concerned 
with fertility rates (HCSO, 2013). With the celebra-
tion of traditional family values, the government 
goes against the slight shift towards liberalization of 
family roles since the mid-2000s (Blaskó, 2011).7 
The new system of family-related payments, together 
with a decrease in unemployment benefits, has, at 
the same time, contributed largely to the polarization 
of society and an increase in poverty (Szívós and 
Tóth, 2013).
Conclusion
Post-socialist states have experienced two waves of 
crises since the mid-2000s. Economic downturn and 
political tensions occurred following their EU acces-
sion, while the global crisis led to recession and 
increased unemployment, protracting already existing 
social problems and fostering the inherent volatility of 
CEE welfare states. Socialist governments in Hungary 
reacted to the crisis with cuts in the welfare system 
during 2008 and 2009. The conservative coalition, 
taking over in April 2010, continued with austerity in 
certain social policy fields but also engaged in a dras-
tic turnover of the whole political and welfare system. 
Fidesz and its minor coalition partner, the KDNP, 
have used the crisis as a justification and their two-
thirds majority as an opportunity to carry out major 
reforms in an emergency manner (Inglot, 2008), act-
ing as if the country was in a ‘revolutionary’ situation. 
In politics, this meant the elimination of checks and 
balances (including the Constitutional Court) from the 
way of the executive power as well as the adoption of 
a new constitution and cardinal acts without the agree-
ment of opposition parties. Tripartite negotiations 
have ceased and consultation with civil society 
stopped. The Fundamental Law has been, as we have 
shown in this article, amended several times accord-
ing to the interest of the government, leading to 
important social policy changes that are now carved 
in stone and thus limit the opportunity of forthcoming 
governments to adopt change. There has been minor 
protest against these reforms, especially if compared 
to the reaction of other Visegrád countries to similar 
governmental efforts.8
The directions of welfare reforms have been 
diffuse, embracing opposing ideologies of neo-
liberalism, étatism and neo-conservatism. The case 
studies of the pension reform, the unemployment 
benefit system and family policies presented in this 
article well illustrated these policy shifts. Ideological 
diffusiveness has not only occurred between but also 
within social policy fields. For example, stopping 
early retirement can be considered a characteristi-
cally neo-liberal policy, while obligatory retirement 
at the age of 62 is more of an autocratic étatist meas-
ure that goes against liberal norms and the activating 
aims of the European Union. While cutting unem-
ployment insurance benefit to the record-low period 
of 3 months is a radical neo-liberal workfare meas-
ure, centralization of the public works programme 
and the eliminating of local initiatives and flexible, 
individualized solutions resembles the étatism of 
state socialist and pre-war regimes. The introduction 
of 16 percent flat personal income tax (a neo-liberal 
idea) combined with very generous child tax credits 
were supposed to create work incentives while also 
boosting fertility rates among the better-off. At the 
same time, as part of a conservative familialist 
agenda, long parental leaves have been restored 
which keep women away from the labour market. 
Traditional family values have also been incorpo-
rated into the Fundamental Law. The lack of clear 
policy plans on envisioned changes and the complete 
absence of monitoring processes add greatly to the 
volatility of the Hungarian welfare state and contrib-
ute to the further decrease of trust in welfare and 
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public institutions (Oorschot et al., 2012; Szívós and 
Tóth, 2013).
From among all the diffuse policy directions, 
there is one which stands out: the lack of efforts to 
protect the most vulnerable from the effects of the 
crisis. The ‘able-bodied’ poor have been increas-
ingly punished for their own situation: homelessness 
became criminalized and social assistance with-
drawn for an increasing share of long-term unem-
ployed. Such policy agenda can be contrasted to that 
of the ‘embedded neo-liberalism’ of the 1990s when 
the ‘losers of the transition’ were better protected 
against deep poverty (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012). 
Social policy has lost much of its poverty-reducing 
potential recently – no wonder that research indi-
cates a polarization of the society (Szívós and Tóth, 
2013). The relative poverty rate (calculated as 
60 percent of the median income) grew from 13.6 in 
2009 to 17 percent in 2012, and the rate of child pov-
erty increased from 21 to 26 percent in the same 
period (Szívós and Tóth, 2013: 42). Another calcula-
tion shows that the number of those living below 
subsistence level has reached 4 million out of the 
10 million Hungarians (Ferge, 2013). Poverty has an 
increasingly ‘ethnic’ face: whereas approximately 
5–10 percent of the total population belongs to the 
Roma minority in Hungary, one-third of all poor 
people was Roma in 2012 as compared to 20 percent 
in 2007 (Szívós and Tóth, 2013: 46.). No less than 
90 percent of Roma Hungarians live in severely 
deprived circumstances, including no possibility of 
eating meat every second day, and afford proper 
heating during the winter (Szívós and Tóth, 2013: 
47). Consequences of lost employment opportunities 
and decreased social protection include the boost of 
migration out of the country especially among mid-
dle-aged skilled men (Sik, 2012).
The Hungarian case also highlights the general 
connection between crisis, democracy and the role 
of the European Union. Hard economic times seem 
to mean ‘hard times for democracy, particularly 
when it is new and fragile’ (Diamond, 2011: 17). 
Does the EU membership actually mean more 
democracy and welfare for the European countries? 
The European Union has remained very strict with 
candidate countries regarding compliance with the 
common values but ‘lacks effective monitoring and 
sanctioning tools once they have joined the EU’ (EP, 
2013: 35). Can the European Union be a protector of 
democratic values, human dignity and social rights 
or is it only prepared to monitor and sanction the 
macro-economic stability of member states? Recent 
suggestions to establish a ‘democracy watchdog’ 
within the European Union might be worth listening 
to. Such an institution would work to prevent the 
spread of undemocratic practices elsewhere in 
Europe (Müller, 2013), and it could also mean more 
say for those most affected by dismantled welfare 
systems.
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Notes
1. The concept of ‘post-accession crisis’ refers to the 
economic recession and (related) political problems 
that occurred in the Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) countries following their 2004 and 2007 EU 
accession (Ágh, 2013; Bohle and Greskovits, 2012).
2. New member states (NMS) partially privatizing 
their pension systems had the opportunity to deduct 
transition costs from their budget deficit until 2010. 
Hungary, alongside with other countries, asked the 
European Commission for the extension of this dero-
gation – without success.
3. To avoid scrutiny by the Constitutional Court on 
grounds of gained social insurance rights, contri-
butions paid by employers have been re-named to 
‘social tax’ (szociális hozzájárulási adó) to which no 
future claims could be attached. See Act CLVI/2011.
4. Truancy has been defined as missing more than 50 
classes per term. The rules of exclusion from benefits 
are complicated and non-transparent, and may last for 
2, 3, 12 or even 14 months.
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5. Roma families tend to have more children than non-
Roma families. Research, however, shows that this is 
strongly linked to the lack of infrastructure, employ-
ment and education opportunities. Once families get out 
of this situation, they tend to follow the same fertility 
pattern as the majority (see Durst, 2007; Janky, 2007).
6. An important measure in this respect was the 1985 
legislation on earnings-based long parental leave 
(Gyermekgondozási Díj (GYED)) with the inten-
tion to boost ‘quality child-bearing’ (see Varsa, 2005; 
Szikra, 2011).
7. For example, non-marital births have been growing 
steeply since 1990, and amounted for 44.5 percent of 
all childbirths in 2012, which is a rate similar to that 
in the United Kingdom (Eurostat, 2013).
8. Besides Polish demonstrations against the reforms of 
the pension system and the labour code, we have to 
note that in the Czech Republic, the Constitutional 
Court has recently managed to stop the extension 
of the punitive public works programme (Czech 
Republic Constitutional Court, 2012).
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